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CURRENT DECISIONS
incident to ownership.24 The contention is, first, that the 1866 prede-
cessor of the present § 19 82 5 was enacted to implement the Thirteenth
Amendment, and is arguably not bound, therefore, by a state action
requirement. But if reenactment and revision of the statute subsequent
to passage of the Fourteenth brought it within the scope of that amend-
ment, it still falls within the broad authority of § 5 as it was character-
ized in Guest. Lastly, the plaintiffs assert the presence of state action
by reason of the State's licensing of defendants as real estate brokers
and land developers; its "protection" of their operation by state law
(e.g., zoning and bank lending laws); and its approval of the project
through agencies such as the Highway Department, Building Commis-
sion, and the district which will furnish sewer services to the sub-
division. It is also stressed that the defendants are acting comparably
to a municipality, and should be subject to the same proscription.26
The district and circuit courts dismissed the action, delimited, in
their view, by the dictates of case law. That the Supreme Court will
find itself similarly disposed, however, is seriously questionable. Should
it not, the present case will mark the commencement of a critical new
phase in the Federal-State balance of power over private acts, and the
Court will have done judicially what the Eighty-ninth Congress was un-
able to accomplish legislatively.
Richard A. Repp
Constitutional Law--FREE SPEECH-JUDICIAL REVIEW OF QUALIFI-
TIONS OF LEGISLATORS. Julian Bond, a Negro and a duly elected member
of the House of Representatives of Georgia, was deprived of his seat
24. Reitman v. Mulkey, supra note 14. One reading of this case is that the power to
alienate real property freely is not a right, since it is its "authorization" which is here
being condemned. While the amendment to the California constitution prohibited only
infringement on the right to sell to whom one pleases, the Court concluded that it
"was intended to authorize, and does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing
market. The right to discriminate is now one of the basic policies of the State.' Id.
at 1634 (Italics added.).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
26. See Reitman v. Mulkey, supra note 14 at 1635 (concurring opinion).
"Zoning is a state and municipal function .... When the State leaves that function
to private agencies or institutions who are licensees and who practice racial discrimina-
tion and zone our cities into white and black belts or black and white ghettoes, it
suffers a governmental function to be performed under private auspices in a way the
state itself may not act .... Leaving the zoning function to groups who practice racial
discrimination and are licensed by the States constitutes state action in the narrowest
sense in which Shelley v. Kxaemer can be construed?'
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after a house investigation into his statements criticizing the policies of
the federal government in Viet Nam and the operation of the Selective
Service laws.' In light of these statements, the House felt that he could
not uphold the oath of office which he was required to take by the
Georgia Constitution.2 The plaintiff brought this action for injunctive
relief, claiming that the exclusion because of his political statements
violated his rights under the First Amendment.3
The Supreme Court of the United States, unanimously reversing a
lower court decision, 4 held that such exclusion was a violation of the
plaintiff's freedom of speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment.'
The Court rejected the contention that a state could demand a stricter
degree of loyalty from elected officials than from ordinary citizens. It
reasoned that a legislator, because of his position, must be as free as
anyone else to discuss major issues6 and is entitled to the same Consti-
tutional protections in this area as other citizens.7
The United States Constitution provides that "each house shall be
the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own mem-
bers." 8 The courts have consistently held that Congress alone has the
power to determine elections, returns and qualifications of its mem-
1. The plaintiff subscribed to a SNCC policy statement which called United States
concern for freedom in foreign countries hypocritical and designed to hide American
intentions. It equated the murder of a Negro in Alabama and the killing of peasants in
Viet Nam. The plaintiff stated that he was a pacifist and opposed the draft. He stated
that, as a second class citizen, he felt no responsibility to support the war.
2. GA. CoNsT. art. 3, § 4 (1945):
Oath of members-Each Senator and Representative, before taking his seat,
shall take the following oath, or affirmation, to-wit: "I will support the
Constitution of this State and of the United States, and on all questions and
measures which may come before me, I will so conduct myself, as will, in
my judgment, be most conducive to the interests and prosperity of this
State."
3. Bond v. Floyd, 87 S.Ct. 339 (1966).
4. The decision was appealed directly from the District Court under 28 U.S.C. 1253.
5. U.S. CONSr. amend. I states: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech ... "
6. The Court applied the rule from New York Times v. Sullivan that "debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open.", supra note 3, at 349.
7. This is the first time a court has assumed jurisdiction to determine the qualifica-
tions of a member-elect of a legislative body when the legislature, by constitution, has
been given this power. In addition to the fact that courts have traditionally held
that they have no jurisdiction in this area, most of the cases litigated have concerned
the election rather than the qualifications of members. Since the power given to the
legislatures to judge elections, returns, and qualifications is identical, what the courts
say about one is equally applicable to all.
8. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, S 5. Compare this to the Georgia provision, infra note 15.
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bers.9 In Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham,10 the Court said
that the House of Representatives, in determining the validity of the
election of a Representative, had the power to conduct an investigation,
get the facts, apply the law and finally to "render a judgment which is
beyond the authority of any other tribunal to review." 11 The issue
was again raised in Keogb v. Horver12 and the lower court affirmed
the earlier decision when it said:
The many volumes of election contest cases in which every con-
ceivable question has been raised with reference to the right of
persons to sit as members of Congress, together with the fact that
there are no court decisions to be found, controlling such matters,
bear mute but enforcible evidence that this court has no authority
to be the judge of the manner in which such members were
elected...l3
Similarly, the state courts have also determined that they are with-
out jurisdiction to determine elections, returns, or qualifications of mem-
bers of Congress. 14 Most state constitutions have provisions similar to
art. I, § 5 of the United States Constitution and art. 3, § 7 of the
Georgia Constitution providing that the power to judge elections, re-
turns, and qualifications for state legislatures rests in the legislative
bodies themselves.'r The state courts have consistently held that they
have no jurisdiction in this area even though the action of the legisla-
ture might be arbitrary and in violation of fundamental rights.16
9. Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597 (1929); Application of
James, 241 F. Supp. 858 (S.D. N.Y. 1965); Sevilla v. Elizalde, 112 F.2d 29 (D.C. Cir.
1940); Keogh v. Homer, 8 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Ill. 1934).
10. Barry v. United States ex reL Cunningham, supra note 9.
11. ld. at 613.
12. Keogh v. Homer, supra note 9.
13. ld. at 935.
14. State ex rel. Fleming v. Crawford, 28 Fla. 441, 10 So. 118 (1891); Belknap v.
Board of Canvassers, 94 Mich. 516, 54 N.W. 376 (1893); State ex rel 25 Voters v. Selvig,
170 Minn. 406, 212 N.W. 604 (1927); People ex rel. Fitzgerald v. Voorhis, 222 N.Y.
494, 119 N.E. 106 (1918).
15. The Georgia provision as found in the GA. CoNsr. art. 3, § 7 (1945) is:
Elections, returns, etc.; disorderly conduct.-Each House shall be the judge
of the election, returns, and qualifications of its members and shall have the
power to punish them for disorderly behavior, or misconduct, by censure,
fine, imprisonment, or expulsion, but no member shall be expelled, except
by a vote of two-thirds of the House to which he belongs.
16. Hughes v. Melton 11 Colo. 489, 19 P. 444 (1888); Rainey v. Taylor, 166 Ga. 476,
143 S.E. 383 (1928); Fowler v. Bostick, 99 Ga. App. 428, 108 S.E. 2d 720 (1959); Beatty
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The primary basis on which the courts have attributed their refusal
to accept jurisdiction lies in the distinction between political and civil
rights.17 Political rights are those involving the establishment and man-
agement of the government, including the right to hold elective office.' s
Civil rights have been broadly defined to include all those rights ac-
corded to every member of a district or nation.'9 Civil rights do not
encompass political rights. This distinction is significant since tradi-
tionally courts have refused to exercise jurisdiction in cases involving
political rights, nor will they issue an injunction to protect the enjoy-
ment of such rights or to assist one in acquiring such rights.20
Thus, in the case at bar, the Court in acquiring jurisdiction was faced
with two conflicting principles, although it did not discuss them. On
the one hand, the rule that courts do not intervene in determining
elections, returns, or qualifications of members of legislatures because
the right to office is a political right which courts will not enforce,2"
and because this traditionally has been a constitutional power attributed
to the legislatures.' On the other hand, the fact that the First Amend-
ment guarantees that freedom of speech will not be abridged.23 Here,
the plaintiff had a political right to be seated, but a civil right to ex-
press his feelings. The states have the right to determine qualifications
of legislators, but the federal courts must enforce the provisions of the
United States Constitution. The mere fact that the Court assumed
jurisdiction in this case, therefore, implied that when civil and political
rights are in conflict, the civil rights will prevail.
The Court, in assuming jurisdiction, relied on Gommillion v. Light-
foot24 which states: "When a State exercises power wholly within the
dominion of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review.
v. Myrick, 218 Ga. 629, 129 S.E. 2d 764 (1963); Reif v. Barrett, 355 II. 104, 188 N.E.
889 (1933); State ex rel. Gramelspacher v. Marten Circuit Court, 231 Ind. 114, 107 N.E.
2d 666 (1952); Covington v. Buffett, 90 Md. 569, 45 A. 204 (1900); Dinan v. Swing, 223
Mass. 516, 112 N.E. 91 (1916); Attorney General v. Board of Canvassers, 155 Mich. 44,
118 N.W. 584 (1908); State ex rel. Ford v. Cutts, 53 Mont. 300, 163 P. 470 (1917);
State ex rel. Boulware v. Porter, 55 Mont. 471, 178 P. 832 (1919); Re McNeill, 111
P. 235, 2 A. 341 (1886); State ex rel. Sullivan v. Schnitger, 16 Wyo. 479, 95 P. 698 (1908).
17. Reif v. Barnett, supra, note 16.
18. Blackman v. Stone, 17 F. Supp. 102, 107 (S.D. Ill. 1936).
19. 9 RULiNG CASE LAw Elections 10 (W. Mckinney & B. Rich ed. 1925).
20. Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. 50 (6 "Wall. 50)
(1867); Blackman v. Stone, supra, note 18; Green v. Mills, 69 Fed. 852 (4th Cir. 1895).
21. Supra, notes 18 & 20.
22. Supra, notes 9, 14 & 16.
23. Supra, note 5.
24. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
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But such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an
instrument for circumventing a federally protected right." 25 The in-
ference being that, while the states have the power to determine the
qualifications of its elected representatives, these qualifications may not
in any way infringe on a federally guaranteed right. The application
of the criteria, as well as the criteria themselves, are subject to review by
the courts.20
Prior to this decision, the power of judging elections, returns, and
qualifications of members rested exclusively with the legislatures. The
effect of this ruling is to circumscribe the area within which a legis-
lature may set and apply qualifications for admittance to the elec-
tive body. Any qualifications and the applications thereof will be
subject to judicial review if they infringe on Constitutional guarantees.
If the legislatures are now limited in this respect, will this limitation
carry over into their power to determine elections and returns or to
expel a member?27 If the logic of this case is strictly extended, it would
25. Id. at 347.
26. The committee of the Georgia House which conducted the investigation came
to the conclusion that the plaintiff's statements
...showed he "does not and will not" support the Constitution of the
United States and of Georgia, that he "adheres to the enemies of the State
of Georgia" contrary to the State Constitution, that he gives aid and comfort
to the enemies of the United States, that his statements violated the Selective
Service Act, 50 U.S.C. 462, and that his statements "are reprehensible and are
such as tend to bring discredit and disrespect to the House.' Bond v. Floyd,
supra, note 3 at 344.
The Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff could not have been convicted under
federal law.
27. Legislative bodies have traditionally had exclusive and unlimited power to expel
its members. In Hiss v. Hardett, 4 Gray 468, 63 Am. Dec. 768, 770 (1885), the court
said:
The power of expulsion is a necessary and incidental power to enable the
house to perform its high functions, and is necessary to the safety of the
state. It is a power of protection. A member may be physically, mentally,
or morally wholly unfit; he may be afiicted with a contagious disease, or
insane, or noisy, violent, and disorderly, or in the habit of using profane,
obscene, and abusive language . . . If the power exists, the house must
necessarily be the sole judge of the exigency which may justify and require
its exercise.
It is well settled in the Senate that "the right to expel exists in all cases where the
offense is such as in the judgment of the Senate is inconsistent with the trust and duty
of a member." SToRY oN Thm CoNsi-rtrnoN 838 (1840). The earliest example of this
power is found in the case of W. Blount who was expelled from the Senate in July
1797, for a "high misdemeanor entirely inconsistent with his public trust and duty as
a Senator.' SEaaEAr, CoNsrrrunoNAL LAw 2d 302 (1830). He was declared guilty
of this misdemeanor (attempting to prevent a United States agent among the Indians
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appear that these powers would be similarly restricted.28 Cases of this
nature have been rare. Perhaps this ruling will provide the foothold on
which other related claims will find their bearings, thereby leading
to a more explicit definition of the law.
Karen Atkinson
Constitutional Law-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-'"FRuirr OF POISONOUS
TREE" DOCTRINE. Petitioner Jacobs had been convicted in the state
court of armed robbery on a plea of guilty after he and his co-de-
fendants had signed a joint confession acknowledging their respective
parts in a holdup. Jacobs originally had been arrested without a warrant
for his part in the robbery solely on the basis of a confession of his
co-defendant Kelly. In subsequent habeas corpus proceedings the Fed-
eral District Court found that since Kelly's arrest without a warrant
had been without probable cause, his confession was involuntary; and
therefore, inadmissible against him.' On the basis of these facts Jacobs
from completing his duties), even though no presentment or indictment was found
against him. It appears that there was no law under which he could have been prose-
cuted.
The Senate during the debates on the admission of Senator Smoot of Utah, found
itself in a situation similar to the one the Georgia House faced with the plaintiff. Smoot
met all the written qualifications, but because he was one of the Apostles of the Mormon
Church, there was strong feeling that he would be unable to fulfil his oath of office
as a Senator. (He was a polygamist, but polygamy was not yet against the law.) During
the course of debates on his qualifications, it was finally determined to seat him and
then discuss the possibility of expelling him. Once seated, however, the Senate refused
to expel him. HiND's PRECEDENTS Vol. I, 481-484 (1907).
A modern counterpart is found in the position of the House of Representatives with
regard to seating Adam C. Powell. There is some feeling that he should be seated and
then censured by some means, perhaps expulsion.
An important question left unanswered is: if Bond had been a member of the House
when the statements were made and the House had then expelled him, would this
action be subject to review by the courts?
28. The case is as noteworthy for what it assumes as for what it says. It does not
discuss the difference between political and civil rights; it makes the direct statement,
supported by the First Amendment, that a state cannot require a higher degree of
loyalty from elected officials than from ordinary citizens; and it neglects the line of
authority holding that the legislature alone has the power to judge the qualifications,
returns, and elections. Because the Court did not include its reasoning, but merely its
conclusions on these subjects, the importance of this case as a precedent is questionable.
1. The District Court determined that the arresting officers had made the arrest on the
basis of "leads" given them by an informer. When questioned by the court as to the
identity of the informer the police were unable either to establish his identity or to
vouch for his reliability, and the court ruled that such a "lead" could not be con-
sidered sufficient probable cause for arrest.
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